Internal Migration and Spatial Dispersal; Changes in Israel's Internal Migration Patterns in the New Millennium

Sagit Azary-Viesel & Ravit Hananel

To cite this article: Sagit Azary-Viesel & Ravit Hananel (2019): Internal Migration and Spatial Dispersal; Changes in Israel's Internal Migration Patterns in the New Millennium, Planning Theory & Practice

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2019.1597150

Published online: 22 Apr 2019.
Internal Migration and Spatial Dispersal; Changes in Israel’s Internal Migration Patterns in the New Millennium

Sagit Azary-Viesel and Ravit Hananel

Department of Public Policy, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

ABSTRACT

In recent decades, many countries have experienced changes in internal migration patterns. In many places, affluent populations have returned to the cities, while middle-class populations, mainly families with children, have moved to peripheral areas. This study examines the extent to which these trends have occurred in Israel. The findings show that in Israel, middle-class families have moved into less affluent municipalities than those they came from, thereby increasing the socioeconomic level of those municipalities. The study analyzes these findings, their ramifications for the new and veteran residents, and the role of planning authorities in their creation and continuation.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 27 February 2018
Accepted 15 March 2019

KEYWORDS

Internal migration; middle class; housing policy; Israel; spatial dispersal

Introduction

In recent decades, internal migration patterns of individuals and groups have changed significantly in many countries. Affluent populations have returned to the cities, while disadvantaged populations, especially families with children, have been pushed to peripheral areas. These trends have occurred in American cities such as New York and Washington DC, but also, for example, in Amsterdam and London (Andreotti, Galès, & Moreno, 2013; Hyra, 2015; Van der Land, 2007).

Changes in internal migration patterns intensified following the global financial crisis of 2007/8, which was intertwined with a housing crisis in many societies. The manifestations of the crisis varied, but the main symptom was a shortage of affordable housing units for moderate- and low-income households, affecting the lower deciles of the income distribution, but also middle class households (Aalber, 2009a, 2009b; Adelino, Scoar & Severino, 2016; Hananel, 2014). In many cases, the decision to move reflected housing prices and the desire to find affordable housing. In April 2016, The Washington Post asked, ‘Who’s really moving back into American cities?’ and concluded, ‘People aren’t urbanizing in America – wealth is’ (Badger, 2016).

This study examines the extent of such trends, especially among middle-class Jewish households in the Central District of Israel. Israel is an interesting case for examining internal migration, for three main reasons. First, it is a democratic country with an advanced economy that has always had a high degree of centralized policymaking, especially for spatial and land use (planning) policy (Altermann, 2002, pp. 47–58). Second, it is small (21,500 sq. km) and densely populated (395 per sq. km), with a population growth rate (2%) higher than the average (0.7%) in countries with a developed economy (The World Bank, 2018, 2017; World Fact Book, 2016). Third, in the last two
decades Israel has experienced a housing affordability crisis. The initial cause of the surge was low interest rates, instituted, inter alia, because of the global economic crisis. A small and open economy such as Israel’s cannot deviate far from the international interest-rate environment without suffering dramatic changes in its exchange rate. Like other economies, Israel experienced a rise in the prices of yield-bearing assets, including real estate (Benchetrit, 2014; Gruber, 2014). However, unlike most OECD countries, in which housing prices fell sharply following the 2007/8 financial crisis and began to recover only in 2012 (OECD, 2018), Israel’s crisis was expressed by a sharp rise in housing prices. Between 2007 and 2015 the cost of both new and secondhand housing in Israel rose by 70% (Israel’s State Comptroller, 2015). Therefore, it is particularly interesting to examine whether Israel has seen the recent internal migration trends common to many Western countries, and to what extent.

Our findings indicate that the internal migration patterns of middle-class Jewish households in Israel over the last decade differ from those in the United States and Europe: The core-middle and upper-middle classes moved to new urban neighborhoods in small municipalities in central Israel, away from Tel-Aviv, the metropolitan hub, but not far. In Israel the move was not to wealthy suburbs, but rather to localities less affluent than those the new residents had moved from. The new core-middle- and upper-middle-class population raised the socioeconomic level of receiving localities. This study analyzes these findings and discusses the ramifications for both new and veteran residents. It also considers the role of planning authorities in creating new patterns. Finally, the findings connect to a broad theoretical discussion of whether Israel is a metropolitan state, and on the role of the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area in Israeli society.

Because of our focus on the behavior of middle-class Jewish households, we excluded municipalities with exceptional demographic characteristics. Among these municipalities are Arab towns (Taibe, Tira, Kalanswa, and Kefar Kasem); the ultra-Orthodox municipality Elad; and binational municipalities such as Ramla and Lod. The migration patterns of these other populations are potential subjects of further in-depth research.

We begin with a theoretical overview of internal migration and residential mobility before reviewing changes and trends in Israel’s housing policy and residential mobility. We then examine changes in Israel’s internal migration patterns in the last two decades. In the final section, we discuss the influence of the new patterns on the municipalities and residents, and the role of planning authorities in shaping them. The conclusions may shed light on the relationship between centralized housing policy and internal migration and on the influence of changing migration trends on various populations. These issues are relevant to many countries because following the 2007/8 financial crisis many governments formulated policies to increase the supply of affordable housing for both disadvantaged and middle-class households.

Residential Mobility, Internal Migration and Housing Policy

Many variables influence decisions regarding where people live. The classic literature on residential mobility has emphasized life-cycle factors such as changes in the size, age-composition and socioeconomic position of a household (Rossi, 1955; South & Crowder, 1997). Socioeconomic factors, such as income, influence relocation decisions (South & Crowder, 1997). Lucas (1997) demonstrates a relationship between housing costs and internal migration. Karsten (2007) argues that housing issues involve the interrelationship of housing needs and broader family needs. Location and neighborhood play a central role for families with children, which depend more on public services and facilities within and beyond the neighborhood. Distance to work is also
important (Brun & Fagnani, 1994; Karsten, 2007). Households with children are more inclined to build on social networks with neighbors than are childless households. Therefore, they move less often than singles and childless couples, and when they do relocate, they tend to move only short distances, to avoid disconnecting from their social networks (Fischer & Malmberg, 2001; Volker & Verhoeff, 1999).

People prefer to engage in social networks that are homogeneous in class and ethnicity, and household situation (Mazanti, 2005). These social forces may lead to urban segregation between different groups. like-with-like associations. For middle-class families, a sense of belonging is involved in identity construction (Karsten, 2007). Where we live provides information about who we are.

These assumptions were examined with regard to the Israeli case. Analysis of residential environments in Israel should consider the unique socioeconomic, ethnic, national, and religious characteristics of Israeli society as well as the complexity and uniqueness of Israel’s land and planning policies (Carmon, 2001; Hananel & Alterman, 2015).

After World War II, in the United States affluent populations left city centers for the suburbs (Schneider & Phelan, 1993). American cities experienced segregation, characterized by middle-class suburbanization, urban sprawl, strong segmentation along racial/ethnic and/or income lines (Ley, 1996). European cities also segmented, but elites continued to inhabit city centers (Andreotti et al., 2013; Le Gales & Zagrodzki, 2006). Gated communities housing concentrations of homogenous households emerged in many parts of the world, including Israel (Grant & Rosen, 2009; Rosen & Grant, 2011).

The last two decades have seen affluent populations returning to city centers (Hyra, 2015). This has been called the back-to-the-city movement (Sturtevant & Jung, 2011), the urban turnaround (Lang & Simmons, 2003), the fifth migration (Fishman, 2005), the great inversion (Ehrenhalt, 2012) and urban renewal (Hyra, 2015). These changes have occurred in large American cities, and in European cities such as London and Amsterdam. Whereas some celebrate this phenomenon, which increases property values and broadens the municipal tax base and accelerates urban renewal (Davidson, 2008; Florida, 2003), others point to negative consequences for disadvantaged populations, pushed from attractive locations by gentrification (Fainstein, 2010; Marcuse, 2009; Sassen, 2012; Von Hoffman, 2003).

Residential Mobility and Internal Migration in Israel

The literature concerning the relationship between housing policy and internal migration in Israel is limited. The few studies that deal with internal migration and questions of justice include Benchetrit and Czamanski (2009), and Ben-Shahar and Warszawski (2016). Other studies focus on internal migration and residential mobility, especially to central areas such as Tel-Aviv (Benguigui, Czamanski, & Marinov, 2001) or Haifa (van der Vlist, Czamanski, & Folmer, 2011). Some studies review earlier periods or immigration from the former Soviet Union during the 1990s (Braude & Navon, 2006; Carmon, 1998; Portnov, 1998). This study examines changes in internal migration patterns of the Jewish population (except ultra-Orthodox Jews) in central Israel – that is, between the Tel-Aviv District and the Central District – since 2000. To situate our research, we first present a brief overview of changes in Israel’s national housing policy.
Israel’s Spatial Policy, Housing Policy and Internal Migration

Israel has been spatially planned and designed more than most Western democracies (Shachar, 1998). Its housing policy, spatial development and internal migration patterns were initially planned nationally, but have changed fundamentally during the state’s existence. We divided changes into three periods: 1950s–1970s, 1980s–1990s and 2000 to the present. Each period is characterized by a different government housing policy and a different dominant form of spatial dispersal.

1950s–1970s: Mass Immigration Absorption

Israel was established in 1948 as a social-democratic state with a progressive welfare policy. Within three years, massive immigration more than doubled the Jewish population, from 650,000 to more than 1.5 million (Sleifer, 1979) and households needed housing urgently. During this period, the government and various public agencies directed large numbers of immigrants to locations in accordance with what were considered national goals (Shachar, 1998). For national-security reasons – dispersing the Jews throughout the state and limiting the settlement of the Arab population – the spatial policy in the Sharon Plan of 1952 was to build many small towns (Hananel, 2009).

The dominant housing policy was building public housing to achieve the national goals of nation-building, territorial settlement, Jewish immigrant absorption and decent standards of living (Carmon, 2001, p. 182). Most public-housing units were built in peripheral areas (in the Negev in the south or in Galilee in the north) that were relatively isolated physically, socially and culturally (Hananel, 2017; Sleifer, 1979). In the 1950s and 1960s, public housing constituted more than 70% of residential units (Carmon, 2001, p. 183; Hananel, 2018). In the 1970s, when immigration declined substantially, public-housing construction decreased to an estimated 30% of building starts. Government policy then changed from supporting housing construction (supply side) to providing financial assistance for housing ownership through subsidized mortgages (demand side) (Carmon, 1998).

1980s–1990s: The Transition to a Neoliberal Political Ideology

In the 1980s, Israel’s general political ideology changed from a social-democratic welfare state with a collectivist and centralized structure to a globalized capitalist state dominated by neoliberal rationalities, institutions and practices (Shachar, 1998). Israel’s spatial and housing policy expressed these changes (Hananel, 2017; Shachar, 1998).

In 1977, to improve the poor social and physical conditions in 210 neighborhoods throughout the country, the government undertook the Neighborhood Renewal project. Most neighborhoods were in the new towns built in peripheral areas during the 1950s and 1960s and consisted largely of public housing. Some 170 neighborhoods were rehabilitated (Carmon, 1998). In the mid-1980s the government began to privatize public housing. The program was halted in the early 1990s because of the wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union. However, since the mid-1990s the government has stopped new construction and returned to privatizing public housing (Hananel, 2017).

The 1990s saw significant changes in Israel’s spatial policy. The policy of building many relatively small towns was replaced by a metropolitan approach that divided the country into four metropolitan areas: Jerusalem, Tel-Aviv, Haifa and Beersheba (Shachar, 1998). Each of the four
metropolises has a special system for land use and special functions, which developed around a central city, eventually becoming a multi-focal space. Each metropolis serves as one area of employment and choice; its boundaries expand with changes in the transport and communications system (Kipnis, 2009).

The division into four metropolises influenced the urban planning and housing policies and was reflected in many regional and local plans and two national plans (NMP 31 and the Israel 2020 plan). From this period on, most spatial development occurred within the four metropolitan areas (Shachar, 1998). Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics has identified all localities from which more than 20% of the workforce travels daily to the metropolitan area. The emphasis is not only on travel for employment, but also for consumption, entertainment and recreation (Hasson, 2017, p. 3–8).

Since 2000: The Lost Decade

The new millennium heralded a change in Israel’s spatial policy and spatial dispersal (Charney, 2017; Feitelson, 2018; Mualam, 2018). As population and density increase, some argue that the view of four distinct metropolitan areas is gradually collapsing and that Israel is becoming a single-metropolis state, with Tel-Aviv as the core of Israel’s “mini-megalopolis.” Tel-Aviv’s metropolitan area is expanding substantially more than other metropolitan areas, and includes employment areas that serve a large part of Israel’s population (Kipnis, 1997; Razin & Charney, 2015). Indeed, in 2015, Tel-Aviv served as a national employment center (for 11% of persons employed nationwide), whereas the city’s residents constituted only 5.2% of Israel’s population. Tel-Aviv is Israel’s cultural and financial center; about one-third of employees in the financial services and insurance are in the city (Hasson, 2017, pp. 16–17).

A recent study by Razin and Charney (2015) shows metropolitan boundaries that are dynamic but not blurred. That is, most people still prefer to work close to home, and despite the country’s small size and the improvements in transportation and technology, Israel has not developed a contiguous employment zone that covers most of the country. As part of the debate over whether Israel is a single metropolitan area or a state with four distinct metropolitan areas, we examine internal migration in Israel in general and in the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area in particular.

Benchetrit (2014) calls the period since 2000 “the lost decade,” or a decade without a housing policy in Israel, because intensified neoliberalism allowed market forces to determine housing-construction locations, quantity, price and target clientele, thus determining average apartment size and construction standards. The most tangible consequence of the do-nothing government housing policy was the dramatic rise in housing prices. During 2007–2013, housing prices rose by over 70% in real terms, adjusting for changes in the Consumer Price Index (CBS, 2016a). The high cost of living and the sharp increase in housing costs led to the country’s largest social protest ever, in the summer of 2011 (Schipper, 2015).

The 2011 Social Protest and the Ensuing Housing Policy

Following the 2011 protest, housing issues moved to the top of the public and political agenda, and the government made a series of decisions to increase the supply of housing units and reduce prices (Eshel & Hananel, 2019; Feitelson, 2018; Geva & Rosen, 2018). These included establishing the National Housing Committee to accelerate planning procedures, establishing a government-owned company to build housing for long-term rental (Dira le-Haskir) and establishing the Urban Renewal Authority to deal with urban renewal development, both nationally and locally.
The government developed its flagship housing program, Resident’s Price (Mehir la-Mishtaken), whereby the government allows eligible individuals, including young couples who own no apartment or want to upgrade their housing, to enter a lottery to purchase a new apartment at a reduced price. As of September 2018, 130,000 households who met the eligibility requirements had registered for the lotteries, and 53,000 new apartments were already allocated. Of the Resident’s Price housing units, 40% will be in the Central District and about 50% in the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area. To lower prices, the government also changed the terms of sales of state-owned land to developers (Mehir Matara).

Another central policy is the HG (Heskem Gag), an ‘umbrella agreement’ between the government and local authorities to rapidly increase housing supply. To date, 28 HGs have given local authorities budgetary incentives to develop about 400,000 units (Eshel & Hananel, 2019). Eleven agreements concern municipalities in the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area, totaling 174,000 new units.

How has the spatial perception of Israel been changed by these initiatives and the hundreds of thousands of new housing units they produce? How have these initiatives and the planned residential units affected internal migration trends in Israel? And what are the ramifications of changes in internal migration trends for veteran and new residents? These are the questions we address.

Research Methodology: Constraints and Challenges

We designed an integrated methodology that includes multiple sources of information. First, we examined changes in population distribution in the four metropolises from 2000–2015, using data from Israel’s National Insurance Institute. We found that the population distribution of the metropolitan areas had hardly changed since 2000. Therefore, we decided to focus, instead, on the division into districts. Using data drawn from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) migration tables by district, we examined the internal migration balances of the entire Israeli population from 2000–2015. Then we decided to focus on two districts, Tel-Aviv and Central, where there was almost no Arab internal migration.

The migration balance is calculated from the difference in the number of people who entered the municipality and the number who left. We found significant differences between the districts. The most significant positive internal migration occurred in the Central District (an average of 12,100 persons per year) and the most significant negative internal migration occurred in the Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem districts (−5,000 average per year and −4,960 average per year, respectively). We decided to focus on internal migration trends within the Tel-Aviv and Central districts, because more than half the total internal migration in Israel since the 1990s occurred there.

The relations between the Tel-Aviv and the Central districts are particularly interesting because the Central District envelopes Tel-Aviv District from the north, east and south, as shown in Figure 1. More than 1.350 million people live in the Tel-Aviv District, and 2.115 live in the Central District. These two districts (together with Ariel in the east, and Ashdod and Kiryat Malachi in the south) constitute the Tel-Aviv metropolitan area, the largest metropolitan area in Israel, including 3.713 million residents (43% of the country’s population).

We divided the research period into two sub-periods: 2000–2007 and 2008–2015 – before and after the major increase in housing prices.

In the second stage, we selected municipalities for in-depth analysis. First we examined the internal migration balance in municipalities within the two selected districts: Tel-Aviv and the Central districts, as shown in Table 1, based on annual municipality reports of the (CBS, 2016b).
In this stage, we decided to focus on 29 municipalities (10 in the Tel Aviv District and 19 in the Central District). Because we focus on the behavior of middle-class Jewish households, we excluded municipalities with exceptional demographic characteristics. For example, the migration rate of the Arab population in the mixed cities (Ramla and Lod) is less than 1%, and these cities’ negative migration balance results from the migration of Jews. Similar patterns were found in the wholly Arab municipalities (Tira, Qalanswa, Tiebe, and Kafer Kasem), where only a few dozen households migrate each year, yielding a migration balance of 0.1%–0.2%, and where most population growth is due to high fertility rates. We also excluded Elad, an ultra-Orthodox Jewish municipality with a high migration balance and high fertility rate. The migration patterns of the Arab and ultra-Orthodox Jewish population are interesting and deserve separate in-depth examination, but they are not the focus of this study.

In the third stage, we examined some demographic variables that characterize the population that entered each municipality. First, we examined migration trends by age groups. To overcome a lack of data on migration balances by income, we conducted a cross-sectional analysis of
measures drawn from various sources – Central Bureau of Statistics reports, annual municipal reports, and household expenditure surveys – that together shed light on the socioeconomic levels of households and municipalities. We explored two measures used to evaluate the socioeconomic level of the municipality: average wage and changes in socioeconomic cluster. We also examined the correlation between changes in the average wage and the migration balance of the municipalities within each of the districts.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population (thousands)</th>
<th>Migration balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv-Yafo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>354.4</td>
<td>390.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>127.5</td>
<td>129.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>165.7</td>
<td>168.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>136.9</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>137</td>
<td>129.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>83.1</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>25.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>202.2</td>
<td>224.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>167.5</td>
<td>188.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td>37.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
<td>95</td>
<td>106.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
<td>161.6</td>
<td>176.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A minus figure indicates a negative migration balance and a positive figure indicates a positive migration balance.
On the household level, we used the Household Expenditure Survey (2000–2014) to examine changes in the distribution of household composition by income class. We divided households in the Central and Tel-Aviv districts into income classes, using a relative classification based on median disposable income. This makes it possible to examine changes in income distribution that are not reflected in the analysis of quintiles – for example, when income distribution becomes more concentrated around the median. It also lets us examine changes in the weight of different social groups and to focus on the middle class, which presumably experiences the most significant changes (Lama & Sened, 2018).

We calculated five income classes: lower, lower-middle, core-middle, upper-middle and upper. Our starting point was the lower class, defined by the national relative definition of poverty: a household with an income that is less than 50% of the median income (National Insurance Institute of Israel, 2018). The core-middle class is defined by Thurow (1984) as having 75%–125% of the median disposable income, and the upper-middle class as having 125%–200% of the median disposable income (Bar, 2013; Flug, 2012). The lower-middle class is defined as having 50%–75% of that sum, and the upper class as having above 200%.

Analyzing changes in the socioeconomic status of the municipality and of households within the municipality yields a more accurate picture of the relation between migration patterns by age and by income level. Because household expenditure surveys identify only municipalities with more than 50,000 residents, we could examine the classes only on the district level and not in each of the 29 municipalities. The district-level findings help complete the picture.

Analysis of Internal Migration: Tel Aviv and Central Districts

Changes in the Internal Migration Balance

Internal migration trends within the districts in the two periods (2000–2007 and 2008–2015) differ, as shown in Table 1. A minus figure indicates a negative migration balance and a positive figure indicates a positive migration balance. In the first period (2000–2007) we found mixed trends in the municipalities in the Tel-Aviv District (six negative, four positive). However, the total migration balance (the net number of people who arrived, minus those who left) was negative. In the second period (2008–2015) this trend intensified: Eight out of the ten municipalities experienced a negative migration balance, and those leaving increased significantly in number.

In the Central District, the picture is different. In both periods, most municipalities (16 of 19 in 2000–2007 and 17 of 19 in 2008–2015) had a positive migration balance. In the second period, most municipalities saw significant increases (for example, in Petah-Tikva the positive migration balance increased from 3,433 to 20,149, in Kfar-Sava from 678 to 6,711, and in Yavne from 1,987 to 5,127). In total numbers, the picture is even clearer in the second period, as some municipalities in the Central District almost doubled their population: Be’er-Ya’akov (from 9,600 to 18,400 residents), Gedera (16,700 to 26,200), Kfar-Yona (15,000 to 21,600) and Ness-Ziona (32,000 to 46,900).

Changes in the Internal Migration Balance by Age

In the second step, we examined the migration balance of the 29 municipalities in the Tel-Aviv and Central districts by age. The trends in the general migration balance (see Table 1) were also apparent in the distribution by age. All age groups in the Tel-Aviv District experienced a negative migration balance while
municipalities in the Central District experienced a positive one. This trend is consistent across age groups in both districts, except for the 15–29 age group, as shown in Figure 2. However, the contrary findings exist only at the district level and not at the municipal level. In eight of 10 municipalities in the Tel-Aviv District the migration balance of this age group was negative, like that of the other groups. Only in the Tel-Aviv and Ramat-Gan municipalities was this group’s migration balance positive. However, the numbers of the 15–29-year group moving into Tel-Aviv and Ramat-Gan were so significant that they changed the balance of the entire district: 38,497 moved to Tel-Aviv and 4,656 to Ramat-Gan, and the total district balance of this age group was 37,136.

In the Central District, we found mixed trends. Ten of 19 municipalities had a negative migration balance in the 15–29 age group, and nine had a positive one, yielding a negative trend for the district (−665). These findings suggest that young people (probably singles and/or students) are moving out of the Central District municipalities and into Tel-Aviv. The fact that those who migrate to the Tel-Aviv District (and probably mainly to the city of Tel-Aviv) are young and single reflects Tel-Aviv’s importance as the metropolitan center and a global city, which attracts the young. People ages 25–34 make up 21.8% of the city’s population, whereas this age group constitutes only 13.9% of the national population (Hasson, 2017, p. 45).

Another important finding is the significant increase in groups aged 30–64 and 0–14 in the Central District, and the substantial decrease in these age groups in the Tel-Aviv District. These findings suggest that the population that moved into the Central District municipalities and out of those in the Tel-Aviv District, consists of families with young children under 15 years of age. Trends in the elderly population may be explained by many people over 65 moving to the Central District, perhaps following children and grandchildren.

Changes in Internal Migration: Socioeconomic Distribution

Next, we measured migration trends socioeconomically. This included an analysis of the socioeconomic level of the municipality and its residents in two periods, 2000–2007 and 2008–2015.
**The Municipal Level**

On the municipal level, we examined changes in two basic socioeconomic measures: socioeconomic cluster and average wage. In seven of 10 municipalities in the Tel-Aviv District the socioeconomic cluster remained unchanged from 2008, whereas in the other three – Bnei-Brak, Bat-Yam and Holon – it declined. In the Central District, in most municipalities (11 of 19) the socioeconomic cluster increased (Ness-Ziona, Yavne, Be’er-Ya’akov, Rosh-Ha’ayin, Kfar-Yona, Netanya, Kadima-Tzoran, Yehud Neve-Monosson, Shoham and Kfar-Yona). The socioeconomic cluster of the other eight municipalities was unchanged (see Table 2).

**Table 2.** Changes in socioeconomic cluster and average wage.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Socioeconomic cluster</th>
<th>Average real wage constant prices (2000 basis)</th>
<th>Growth rate (2000 basis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv-Yafo</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>5970 6906 7827</td>
<td>16% 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Gan</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6304 6600 7745</td>
<td>5% 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holon</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>7078 7872 8889</td>
<td>11% 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giv’atayim</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>5246 5165 6441</td>
<td>-2% 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bnei Brak</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>3 2 2</td>
<td>4274 3880 4125</td>
<td>-9% 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bat Yam</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>6 6 6</td>
<td>4320 4160 5158</td>
<td>-4% 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or Yehuda</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>5 5 5</td>
<td>4521 4867 5668</td>
<td>8% 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramat Hasharon</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>7658 9487 9976</td>
<td>24% 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herzlia</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6566 7728 8392</td>
<td>18% 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiryat Ono</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6848 8116 9896</td>
<td>19% 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giv’at Shmuem</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6987 8015 9022</td>
<td>15% 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yehud-Monosson</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6091 7000 8080</td>
<td>15% 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ra’anana</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>7325 8744 9839</td>
<td>19% 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rishon Lezion</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6051 5941 7222</td>
<td>-2% 22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petah Tikva</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>5554 5557 7195</td>
<td>0% 29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hod Hasharon</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6840 8536 9573</td>
<td>25% 12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kfar Sava</td>
<td>Tel-Aviv</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6393 6685 8470</td>
<td>5% 27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ness Ziona</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6274 6953 9178</td>
<td>11% 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Be’er Ya’akov</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>5253 5153 7629</td>
<td>-2% 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosh Ha’ayin</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>5864 6231 7015</td>
<td>6% 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehovot</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>6021 5734 7349</td>
<td>-5% 28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoham</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>9371 10475 10953</td>
<td>12% 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yavne</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 8 8</td>
<td>5411 5434 6691</td>
<td>0% 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadima-Tzoran</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 7 8</td>
<td>5907 7851 9001</td>
<td>17% 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netanya</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 7 8</td>
<td>4464 4773 6029</td>
<td>7% 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gederia</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 7 8</td>
<td>5506 6041 7994</td>
<td>10% 32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kfar Yona</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 7 8</td>
<td>4988 5929 7538</td>
<td>19% 27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modi’in Macabim-Reut</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 7 8</td>
<td>8391 8567 9986</td>
<td>2% 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gan Yavne</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>8 7 8</td>
<td>6074 6054 7909</td>
<td>0% 31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A minus figure indicates a negative migration balance and a positive figure indicates a positive migration balance.
Second, we examined changes in the average real wage in the municipality. Like many countries, Israel has seen a consistent increase in the living standard. The average wage increased in all municipalities we examined. To analyze changes over time, we compared the growth rates. During the first period (2000–2007) in both districts the average growth rate of the real average wage was 7%. In both districts, we found significant variation in the growth rate by municipality. In the Tel-Aviv District, for example, the growth rate in Bnei-Brak was −9%, while in Ramat-Hasharon it was 24%. In the Central District, in Rehovot it was −5%, but in Hod-Hasharon it was 25%. In the second period (2008–2015) we found significant differences between districts. In the Tel-Aviv District the average growth was 15%, while in the Central District it was 22%. Moreover, in this period less variation occurred between the municipalities in each district.

To explain our findings, we examined the correlation between the population growth rates in each municipality and the growth rate in its average real wage. We found significant differences between the two periods. Whereas the first period showed no correlation (0.02) between these indicators, the second period had a strong correlation (0.53) as shown in Figure 3. The correlation in the Central District was high (0.67), whereas in the Tel-Aviv District there was no correlation. This means that the municipalities experiencing a significant increase in population size also experienced an increase in the average wage – an increase in the standard of living. An increase in population can be caused by two main factors: natural increase or migration. Because we focused on the Jewish population and from the outset excluded from the analysis municipalities with exceptional population growth patterns, we assume that the population increase can be attributed to internal migration.

When we combine the internal migration trends presented in Table 1 with the analysis of the average wage and the socioeconomic index in Table 2, we can say with certainty that the population that migrated to the municipalities in the Central District was stronger
socioeconomically than the veteran population. Next, we examine changes in the population composition in each of the districts.

**Household Level**

To analyze changes in the population composition, we divided households into five classes: lower, lower-middle, core-middle, upper-middle and upper. This analysis draws on the household expenditure survey (2003–2014). Because most of the relevant municipalities (18 of 29) in 2003 had fewer than 50,000 residents and the household expenditure survey identifies only municipalities having more than 50,000 residents, we could analyze the classes only at the district level and not at the municipal level.

For each year, we calculated the size of each of the five classes and then the average for the whole period. We unified the core-middle and upper-middle classes so that only four classes appear, as presented in Figure 4. Such unification is common in the literature (Bar, 2013; Flug, 2012).

The distribution by income classes varies in the two districts. In the Tel-Aviv District we found no significant changes in the distribution of classes between the periods. The most significant change occurred in the upper class, which decreased from 27% to 23%. However, in the Central District we found significant differences between the two lower classes and three upper classes. The core-middle and upper-middle class increased by 9% (from 51% to 60%) and the upper class by 1% (from 13% to 14%). However, the lower-middle class decreased by 6% (from 21% to 15%), and the lower class by 4% (from 15% to 11%).

These findings indicate a fundamental change in the population composition of the Central District municipalities and may explain earlier findings. Taking all findings into consideration, we conclude that the massive internal migration consisted largely of an affluent middle-class population with children.

![Figure 4. Class distribution in Tel-Aviv and Central districts: 2003–2007, 2008–2014.](image-url)
Conclusions and Discussion

In recent decades, internal migration trends have changed in many places. Our study set out to examine changes in Israel’s internal migration and to discuss ramifications for the new and veteran populations of the municipalities residents moved to. We examined the influence of changes in internal migration patterns on Israel’s spatial division, particularly the relations between Tel-Aviv District and the Central District, both of them Tel-Aviv metropolitan areas. To this end, we examined and compared migration trends within the municipalities of Tel-Aviv and Central districts in two periods: 2000–2007 and 2008–2015 – before and after the dramatic rise in housing prices.

We found essential differences in migration patterns between the two periods and the two districts. Whereas in the first period (2000–2007) we found mixed trends in both districts, in the second period (2008–2015) most Tel-Aviv District municipalities had a negative migration balance, while in most municipalities in the Central District the migration balance was positive, increasing their population significantly. In this period the population of some Central District municipalities almost doubled. The analysis of the internal migration balance in the distribution by age suggests that those who migrated into Tel-Aviv District municipalities were mainly young singles, whereas those who migrated out of the Tel-Aviv District and into the Central District were mainly households with children (Figure 1).

These trends differ from those documented in the literature from other Western countries, where research suggests that households with children tend to move less than singles and childless couples, and that when they do, they tend to move only short distances within the city, to avoid disconnecting from their social networks (Fischer & Malmberg, 2001; Karsten, 2007; Volker & Verhoeff, 1999). In Israel, however, the most frequent move was of households with children. Moreover, massive migration was to the Central District municipalities farther from Tel-Aviv, such as Gan-Yavne (30 km), Modi’in Macabim-Reut (25 km), Kfar-Yona (22 km) and Gedera (22 km).

How can we explain these findings and their deviation from theory? We consider one possible explanation that focuses on the relations between the districts and the role of the Tel-Aviv metropolis. Israel is a small country, and by international standards the distances involved are not great. In many countries, 30 km (18.6 miles) – the distance from the metropolitan core (Tel-Aviv municipality) to the farthest municipality in the Central District (Gan-Yavne) – is considered commuting distance within a city. Moreover, because Tel-Aviv and the Central District are part of the same Tel-Aviv metropolis, the movement of families with children within the borders of the metropolis does not necessarily require a change in the workplace, centers of recreation and culture, even of friends. Our findings indicate Tel-Aviv’s key role as a center for employment and recreation and a blurring of boundaries within the metropolis’s rings.

Our findings seem to support the argument that Israel’s division into four metropolitan areas is gradually collapsing and that Israel is becoming a metropolitan island state, with Tel-Aviv as its core (Kipnis, 2009). However, we examined only the Tel-Aviv metropolis. Are the trends we found in Tel-Aviv metropolis relevant to the metropolises of Haifa, Jerusalem and Be’ersheba? The answer requires separate in-depth research, because each of Israel’s four metropolitan areas tells a different story and has a population with different characteristics. Moreover, as we have seen, the distribution of the population among the four metropolitan areas has hardly changed since 2000. This finding reinforces the argument of Razin and Charney (2015) that despite changes in the metropolitan boundaries, the distinction between the four metropolitan areas remains. Understanding changes in Israel’s spatial division requires more research and data.
The most interesting discrepancy between what the international literature suggests and the Israeli case concerns the socioeconomic level of the municipalities and of those who moved. Whereas in European countries, and even more so in the United States, the internal migration of affluent middle-class populations in recent decades was mainly from less to more affluent municipalities, and in many cases from the suburbs back to the city (Fishman, 2005; Hyra, 2015; Sturtevant & Jung, 2011), in Israel we found the opposite trend. In Israel, the population that migrated to the Central District municipalities was stronger socioeconomically than the veteran population there. Municipalities in the Central District that experienced a positive migration balance in the second period (2008–2015) also experienced an increase in the municipality’s socioeconomic cluster. At the household level, in the Central District we found a high correlation (0.67) between the migration balance of the municipalities and the increase in the average real wage of local residents. This means that more affluent households moved into less affluent communities.

Examination of the changes in the composition of the classes in each district in both periods reinforces these findings. While in the Central District there was a significant increase in the proportion of households of the upper classes and a decline in the proportion of the lower classes; in the Tel-Aviv District, there was a decline in the proportion of the upper classes and an increase in that of the lower classes.

Prima facie, these findings indicate a more egalitarian distribution of the population (by socioeconomic status) in the region and narrowing spatial gaps between the center and more distant regions. In practice, this is not the case. To understand the impact of changing patterns of internal migration on inequality between individuals and groups in society, we must ask two additional questions: What explains these migration patterns? What are the current and future ramifications of these patterns for the municipality, its veteran residents and its new residents, and what can be done to minimize problematic consequences?

One possible explanation is the dramatic increase in housing prices since 2007. In the Tel-Aviv District prices increased by 88%, but only by 71% in the Central District. Consequently, households looking for new housing found it more affordable to move from the Tel-Aviv District to the Central District.

And indeed, at the beginning of the 2000s (the first period), housing prices in most Central District municipalities were lower than those in Tel-Aviv District municipalities. However, this changed during the second period (2008–2015), when in some municipalities in the Central District housing prices were almost the same as, or even higher than, those in some of the municipalities of the Tel-Aviv District (such as Or-Yehuda, Bat-Yam, Bnei-Brak, and even Holon). In Holon (Tel-Aviv District).8 Nevertheless, in the second period, we found a significant negative migration balance (both in percentages and in absolute numbers) in municipalities of the Tel-Aviv District and a significant positive migration balance in the Central District, even in the municipalities farthest from the city of Tel-Aviv. Thus, housing prices and the distance from the city of Tel-Aviv alone cannot explain the changes in internal migration patterns.

So what made people, mainly middle-class families with children (as the findings show) move into less affluent and more distant municipalities from the city of Tel-Aviv? As a possible explanation, we focus on the role of the land use (planning) policy and the national housing policy in the creation and intensification of these trends.

In-depth examination of the Central District municipalities that experienced a significant internal migration balance indicates that the newcomers did not settle in older neighborhoods, but
rather in attractive new neighborhoods that are physically and socially separated from the original neighborhoods. Since the early 1990s, about 30 new neighborhoods have been established, all on a similar plan: high-quality construction, sometimes including single-family homes, on the margins of existing cities, usually in combination with open spaces and new public institutions (Alfasi et al., 2016; Milgrom, 2015). Alongside the old and less affluent municipalities, attractive new neighborhoods are being built, with clear physical separation from older areas (Alfasi et al., 2016). This includes spatial definition of the entrances to the new neighborhoods, roads that bypass older areas, a separate internal road network and visual barriers such as landscaping, and fences. Public services, too, are separate. New public buildings with modern equipment are for the sole use of the newcomers, further detaching the new area from the city (Alfasi et al., 2016).

These neighborhoods have attractive names, such as the Green Neighborhood in Yavne and Em-Hamoshavot in Petah-Tikva, providing newcomers with a sense of belonging, important for middle-class families with children (Karsten, 2007) (see Figure 5). This new neighborhood identity distinguishes the newcomers from the municipality and its veteran and weaker residents. Thus, the newcomers do not live in Yavne, but rather in Young Yavne. They do not live in Rosh-Ha’ayin, but in Psagot-Afek, and certainly not in Netanya, but in the Agamin.

Since the mid-2000s these trends have intensified, supported by government housing policies (such as the HG and Resident’s Price).

Rapid and massive development of attractive new neighborhoods on the outskirts of peripheral municipalities is not unique to Israel and has occurred in many parts of the world. Not only are decision makers and planning authorities not preventing this form of development, they are encouraging it and seeing it as an effective solution to the affordable-housing shortage for young middle-class families (Christophers, 2014; Randolph, Pinnegar, & Tice, 2013; Thörn & Holgersson, 2016). Thus today, more than ever, we must ask: What are the ramifications of these migration patterns for the municipality and its veteran and new residents, and what can be done to minimize problematic consequences?

In the Israeli case, the establishment of attractive new neighborhoods has led to investment in infrastructure and public facilities in those neighborhoods at the expense of investment in older,
weaker ones. Moreover, investment in education programs and opportunities in old and new neighborhoods is unequal. According to Alfasi et al. (2016), the new neighborhoods often have special programs such as computer science that do not exist in the old neighborhoods. Such inequity can already be seen in some Central District municipalities (Gazit, 2017; Zur, 2017).

Differential investment in the two types of neighborhood and the continuation of migration trends may lead to spatial and socioeconomic segregation: one section inhabited by older, economically weaker residents and a newer one populated mainly by more affluent young families (Bischoff & Reardon, 2013). Economic segregation may increase the economic benefits to advantaged families and worsen the economic inferiority of families with low incomes (Wilson, 2012).

We conclude by saying that the current governmental housing policy has concentrated on the advantaged population, while ignoring the needs of many others. As presented in this research, such a policy has many problematic and unjust consequences. To reduce the impact of such consequences, governments everywhere must address the positive and negative ramifications of the changes in the internal migration trends of the 2000s. On the physical and fiscal level, decision makers and planning authorities must ensure investment in order to improve infrastructure, education and health services for all, and especially for disadvantaged communities. Decision makers and planning authorities should also create social-community connections between the different parts of the city and their populations. These three dimensions – physical, fiscal and social – must be integrated as part of any housing policy to produce stronger, but also more sensitive and sustainable, urban spaces for all. The conclusions are relevant to many governments that are developing policies aimed at increasing the supply of affordable housing for both disadvantaged and middle-class households.

Notes

1. The term “Arabs” refers to the mosaic of non-Jewish national minorities living in Israel. Some define themselves as Palestinians, but others (such as Druze and Circassians) do not.
2. A neoliberal economy is characterized by privatizing public companies, curbing organized labor, implementing fiscal austerity mechanisms, retrenching the welfare state, and concentrating economic ownership in the hands of a relatively small group of private asset holders (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002; Ram, 2008).
3. 9 in the Central District, 1 in Tel-Aviv District, 9 HGs in the Southern District (including Ashdod); 4 HGs in Haifa District; 4 in the northern districts, and 1 in the Jerusalem District.
4. Israel’s National Insurance Institute, research center.
5. Cities in which Arab households are more than 10% of the population.
6. The CBS divided municipalities into 10 clusters (10 is the highest socioeconomic level). Ranking is based on socioeconomic variables, such as mean per capita income (including pensions or benefits); residents’ motorization level; percentages of pupils eligible for matriculation, of students in higher education, and of job seekers; the dependency ratio and percentage of residents receiving an income subsidy. http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/1530/pdf/tab01_03.pdf (retrieved 17.November.2017).
7. Data on real wages were calculated by deducting the change in the Consumer Price Index since 2000, which was selected as the base year.
8. For example, the average price of a four-room apartment in 2005 was ~ NIS 750,000, and in Ness-Ziona (the Central District) ~NIS 712,000. At the end of 2015, in Holon, it was ~NIS 1.655m, while in Ness-Ziona it was ~ NIS 1.712m. Madlan: https://www.madlan.co.il/local/%D7%99%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%94?source=source_search#mdlnPriceIndex (retrieved 6 May 2018).
Acknowledgments

We thank the editors, Jill Grant and Heather Campbell, and the anonymous reviewers for their useful and challenging comments, which have strengthened the paper. We deeply thank Itai Sened, Gila Menachem, Naomi Carmon, Ram Fishman, Gilad Rosen, Nurit Alfasi, Talia Margalit, Oren Yiftachel, Joseph Berechman and Daniel Gotlieb for their helpful and insightful comments on earlier versions. We thank Harel Nachmany for graphic assistance. This research benefitted from a grant from the Alrov Institute for Real Estate Research, Coller School of Management, Tel Aviv University.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Sagit Azary-Viesel is a PhD candidate in the Department of Public Policy at Tel-Aviv University. Sagit holds a BA in economics and business administration and an MA in the economics research track, both with distinguished honors from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. She was also an economic researcher at the Shoresh Institution and the Taub Center for Social Policy Studies for seven years. During her work she took part in writing many policy papers and analyzed large data sets.

Dr. Ravit Hananel is a faculty member and head of the Urban Renewal Lab in the Department of Public Policy, Tel-Aviv University. She holds an MA in political science from Tel-Aviv University and a PhD in urban and regional planning from the Technion—Israel Institute of Technology. She is an expert on land policy, land use (planning) policy, and housing policy. Her research engaged in spatial and urban studies, and focuses in the relationship between decision-making in spatial public institutions and questions about distributive justice and social equality.

References

Bar, I. (2013). The middle class and analysis of the changes in its size. Israel: Knesset Research and Information Center. [Hebrew].


Gazit, A. (2017). A peek at the fine print of the largest construction project in Israel. *Calcalist*. Retrieved from [https://www.calcalist.co.il/real_estate/articles/0,7340,L-3716711,00.html](https://www.calcalist.co.il/real_estate/articles/0,7340,L-3716711,00.html)


Kipnis, B. A. (2009). Greater Tel Aviv as a World City: A node in a global network and a dominating entity in Israel’s national space. In Kipnis Ed., Tel Aviv-Yafo from a garden neighborhood to a world city (pp. 228–260). Haifa: Pardes. [Hebrew].


